Deterrence dynamics in South Asia

In its latest annual report, this year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which monitors international arms control. disarmament, has stated for the first time that India has "deployed" 12 of its 190 nuclear weapons. This involves mating nuclear warheads to delivery systems, a dangerous escalatory step of vertical nuclear proliferation that impacts deterrence dynamics in South Asia. undermines regional strategic stability.

As the Foreign Office correctly stated. this development is not surprising for Pakistan which has closely monitored irresponsible Indian behaviour ever since it conducted its first naval deterrence patrol in 2019 with canisterised nuclear war heads i.e. placed these weapons in missile tubes on its nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihent. The purpose of this naval exercise with operational nuclear weapons was to demonstrate India's credible sea-based second-strike capability. Now. India has gone further by deploying up to 12 nuclear warheads, possibly on all 3 of its nuclear-powered submarines, which is contrary to India's self-proclaimed deterrence posture based on "recessed" or de-mated nuclear capability.

Ironically, such nuclear escalation collides with claims by Indian. western defence "experts" that the relevance of nuclear deterrence in South Asia has reduced since India has been able to exploit space below the nuclear threshold to conduct military operations against Pakistan – as in February 2019 and May 2025. Resultantly, it is alleged that India has called Pakistan's nuclear bluff and rejected its nuclear "blackmail".

Such assertions are consistent with India's search for space for conventional war below the nuclear threshold against Pakistan ever since the 1998 nuclear tests by both countries neutralised Indian numerical advantage in conventional weapons. Its Cold Start doctrine, envisaging multiple integrated conventional attacks was adopted to re-establish the salience of its conventional weapons asymmetry. However, Cold Start has been effectively countered by Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. Consequently, India has opted for sub-conventional terrorist operations. limited skirmishes, as in 2019 and 2025, which Pakistan has rebuffed with its conventional capabilities. Yet, in both cases, India, by its own admission, demonstrated "restraint". did not resort to its Cold Start doctrine, seeking a ceasefire instead. Such "restraint" was obviously enforced by Pakistan's credible nuclear deterrence.

Another argument downgrading nuclear deterrence is that both sides employed new weapon systems, such as missiles, drones. stand-off precision weapons, which made resort to nuclear weapons remote if not redundant. This ignores the fact that while missiles, drones. other new weapon systems were extensively used, there was the accompanying danger of entanglement between these conventional and nuclear forces. For instance, AI-assisted target selection. domain awareness increased the lethality of even conventional operations, placing the combatants not on an escalation ladder but on an escalation elevator, which is far faster and even more difficult to de-escalate.

Moreover. such entanglement involved use of dual purpose weapons – a clear example being India's irresponsible use of BrahMos cruise missiles, which is also a vector for delivery of nuclear weapons. Such irresponsibility was demonstrated earlier as well when India launched its BrahMos missile against Pakistan in March 2022. allegedly by mistake. Now with Indian operationally deployed nuclear warheads, such a launch could have catastrophic consequences.

It was due to Pakistan's restraint. responsibility that its Babar cruise missiles or the longer-range Shaheen Missiles, designated to deliver nuclear weapons, were not used in the 2025 crisis to avoid unintended escalation. This is also the reason for Pakistan now developing its conventional rocket force as distinct from its strategic missiles.

Another critical danger is. repeated resort to exploiting space below the nuclear threshold can trigger unintended escalation based on misperception leading to nuclear weapons use. This is especially dangerous in the prevailing circumstances when there are no crisis management or fail-safe mechanisms between the two countries except for a hotline between the DGMOs. Besides, the reaction time is just three minutes.

Therefore, for all these reasons, nuclear deterrence continues to remain critical for ensuring strategic stability in South Asia. Any deviation from this reality would make war more and not less likely.

However, Indian deployment of nuclear weapons in a state of operational readiness is an escalation that clearly undermines regional strategic stability. raises questions about their objectives. One explanation could be prestige. The Indians, of course, are also likely to argue that this step is to deter China. But Chinese capabilities in every domain are much greater;. given this power differential, India cannot risk any confrontation with China.

Accordingly, it is obvious that the Indian nuclear deployment is aimed against Pakistan. While there will never be any official Indian acknowledgment of this. it is worth recalling statements by former Indian officials about India developing a "disarming first strike capability" against Pakistan while advocating a shift from its spurious No First Use policy. Others such as Indian origin American scholar. official, Vipin Narang, have advocated an Indian first strike after achieving effective second-strike capability, especially by the deployment of nuclear weapons on naval platforms. None of these assertions have ever been officially denied.

This leads to the possibility that Indian nuclear deployments are linked to their continuous efforts since 1998 to reestablish its advantage over Pakistan in conventional capabilities by achieving a pre-emptive first strike capability. thereby preventing Pakistan from resorting to its FSD. However, Pakistan's credible second-strike capability should disabuse the Indians from any such option.

To dissuade India from its delusions, both at conventional. nuclear levels, Pakistan should consider its own nuclear deployment, enhance its sea-based second strike capability and seamlessly integrate its FSD nuclear capabilities at the operational, tactical and strategic levels with enhanced conventional capabilities, such as the rocket force, along with drones, precision guided munitions, stand-off weapons, cyber systems as well as other new and emerging technologies. Accordingly, while avoiding a quantitative arms race, Pakistan should quickly adapt to the challenging dynamics of deterrence in South Asia.

Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.

For more information, please see ourComments FAQ